Fish Fried; Guzman To Second?
Adam Dunn and Ryan Zimmerman both went deep for the Nationals, but the big blow in the Anacostia Nine’s 5-3 win at Miami was Mike Morse’s pinch-hit double that provided the difference in the win. Dunn recorded his 37th and Zimmerman his 29th home runs, while J.D. Martin pitched a respectable five complete to give the Nats the win. But Morse was the big story. “He’s gotten some big hits for us,” Nats interim manager Jim Riggleman said of Morse after the game. “That’s twice now that he’s driven in two runs and he’s doing it against right-handed pitching. It’s tough to go up there and pinch-hit, and he’s gotten two two-out hits now. You try to match guys up against left-handers, but those situations haven’t come up and Mike has found a way to stay sharp through his batting practice and his work with [hitting coach] Rick [Eckstein]. He’s prepared and he’s given us great at-bats.”
Ryan Zimmerman celebrates his 29th
The inimitable Carpenter-Dibble duo commented at length on the suggested switch during the Nats broadcast vs. the Marlins on Friday night, with Dibble noting the history of successful position switches in the majors: Michael Young made the transition from short to third in Texas this year, he noted, and “let’s not forget” (Dibs said) that Alex Rodriguez also made the shift from short to third. Of course (as Dibble failed to note) it’s not as if either Young or Rodriguez shifted positions because they were defensive liabilities, but to ensure that two natural shortstops – slick fielding Texas rookie Elvis Andrus and bound-for-the-hall Yankee Derek Jeter — remained at their positions. So let’s get this out of the way: the Nats want to shift Guzman not to take advantage of his abilities, but because they want to hide them. That is, the shift is hung on the rather dubious proposition that bad shortstops are not quite as bad when they play second base.
Dave Cameron over at FanGraphs attempts to unpack that argument — but without really unpacking it. He says that ”if Guzman has lost significant range . . . then it is quite possible that the Nationals will get a larger benefit from reducing the amount of balls hit in his direction than they would by squeezing a marginally better bat into the line-up at second base.” Which means two things: it means that because second basemen get fewer chances Guzman will make fewer errors and it also means that getting a better bat at second won’t make up for Guzman’s weaknesses at short. But even that’s only a part of the picture. The real question here is not about how to match Guzman’s production at the plate, but how to cover up his weaknesses in the field: having failed to field ground balls at shortstop, can we really expect Guzman to field them at second?
And the answer to that question is “no.” Teams don’t get better by hiding their defensive liabilities, but by replacing them — unless . . . (and it’s a pretty big and very important unless) . . . unless that defensive liability meets two other criteria: you can hide the defensive liability by playing him at first base and the defensive liability hits over forty homers a year. Unfortunately for the Nats (and for Guzman), the position of “don’t-worry-about-the-errors-this- brawler-can-hit” is already taken. Then too, shifting Guzman to second because it seems as if it’s an easier position to play doesn’t make sense. Because it’s not true. Not only do second basemen often (but not always) get the same number of chances at second as a shortstop, but playing second doesn’t mean they don’t have to occasionally sprint to their right or left. Plus (plus!) second basemen have to make the turn on a double play. That oughta be easy for Cristian, especially with a gimpy foot. But rest assured, Mike Rizzo said he told Guzman that such a shift has been done before — and successfully. Lots of shortstops have made the move to second and they’ve benefitted from it. You know, like Felipe Lopez. So . . . so what’s really going on here?
My sense is that for all of the tortured explanations given by Rizzo and Riggleman, the Guzman-to-second bandwagon is being contemplated for any number of reasons: none of them having to do with Guzman’s glove. Rizzo might be calculating that trading Guzman is not a good idea, because the return on him would not be nearly enough to compensate for the loss of his bat. Then too, Rizzo must know that there wouldn’t be many takers for a guy who’s still owed $8 million. And . . . and if you really want to trade Guzman, why would you signal that you think his glove is a liability (by saying you’ll shift him to second) and why would you tell every team in the league that the reason his glove is bad is because he’s injured. I can just imagine what Mike might say: “listen, we have this no glove injured shortstop who we owe $8 million — what can you give us?” It could be that Rizzo has his eye on a hotshot shortstop that he can pick up as a free agent: but I’ll be damned if I can find one worth any amount of money. Or it could be (it just could be) that Rizzo is thinking that if you’re really (absolutely no-matter-what) committed to hotshot rookie Ian Desmond and you really don’t want to lose Guzman’s bat, there’s only one way to do it: and that’s keep them both — and play them both. Maybe. But that’s a hell of a gamble.
